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Despite being a rather rare phenomenon, rural territorial
development in Latin America is possible. This was the con-
clusion reached by the research program on Rural Territorial
Dynamics – RTD (Berdegue´ et al., 2012; Berdegue´, Escobal, &
Bebbington, 2015). 1 During 1990–2000, about one out of
every ten municipalities showed a trend toward simultaneous
improvement in per-capita income, poverty reduction, and
decreasing inequality. This means that although there is a pre-
dominant tendency for those three positive outcomes to occur
separately, a few territories achieve them in combination.
A systematic comparison of 20 cases (Berdegue´ et al., 2012;
Berdegue´, Escobal, & Bebbington, 2015) indicates that this
combination of outcomes depends on the existence of territo-
rial coalitions that drive it within a framework of ﬁve favor-
able factors: (i) an agrarian structure that allows small rural
producers to gain access to natural resources that are crucial
for their economic activities, (ii) the linkage of the territory
with dynamic markets that create substantial demand for
goods or services from that place, (iii) a productive structure
characterized by local connections and intersectoral diversiﬁ-
cation, (iv) a city that retains some revenues and redirects
them toward the interior of the territory and/or plays a role
of political “intermediation” with extraterritorial actors, and
(v) public investment in public and private goods that favor
territorial dynamics. Finally, territorial coalitions must act
on those ﬁve factors in order to produce inclusive and equita-
ble growth.
Many territories have coalitions, but they do not stimulate a
rural territorial dynamic of inclusive and equitable growth.
Ferna´ndez, Asensio, Trivelli, and Schejtman (2014) use the
term “transformative territorial coalitions” to refer to those
that do achieve it. A territorial coalition consists of “a series
of diﬀerent actors” that “engage in convergent actions around
a territorial development dynamic” (Ferna´ndez et al., 2014, p.
23). In other words, a transformative coalition is one in which
the members seek to change exclusionary structures inherited
from the past.
The purpose of this paper is to show how and why transfor-
mative territorial coalitions emerge and the extent to which
they deliberately decide to change exclusionary structures.
We seek to analyze the extent to which these coalitions create85a break with social structures inherited from the past or, on
the contrary, reproduce the social conditions that led to them.
This paper therefore addresses the question about the extent to
which it is possible, through deliberate and coordinated
action, to modify a territorial direction determined by inher-
ited structural factors, since, as we have seen, in Latin America
there is a predominance of economic dynamics that are far
from inclusive and equitable.
The concept of transformative territorial coalitions is the
result of theoretical work by Tanaka (2014), which aims at a
deeper understanding of change and social interaction among
key players in rural territories. Tanaka presents three possible
theoretical frameworks to analyze the modus operandi of
“transformative territorial coalitions.” The ﬁrst is rooted in
authors that see actors as emerging from a territory’s produc-
tive structures and interacting conﬂictively amid processes of
economic modernization. Interaction over time will result in
diﬀerent political regimes (Moore, 1979). The second theoret-
ical reference is based on works about collective action and
social movements. These incorporate additional actors that
do not emerge from the economic arena; emphasize the ratio-
nality, identity, and organization of the actors analyzed; and
more explicitly incorporate the problem of the state in negoti-
ation and dispute among actors (Olson, 1965; and Tilly, 1978,
among the most representative). The last theoretical frame-
work refers to the work of political scientists who explore
the formation of coalitions in parliamentary arenas for the
deﬁnition and negotiation of public and government policies
(Riker, 1962).
Based on those sources, Tanaka (2014) suggests that coali-
tions that had a ‘successful’ inﬂuence on Rural Territorial
Development (RTD) involve the convergence of more than
one actor. 2 These actors may emerge from territorial
economic structures or be extraterritorial or state actors or
identity-related movements. Coalitions in RTD processes also
organize based on a dynamic of economic growth. Depending
on the composition of the coalition, on the territory’s prior
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action, the dynamic of economic growth will be more or less
inclusive, equitable, and sustainable. One key factor for
Tanaka concerns the medium- and long-range objectives of
these coalitions. These objectives, deliberately established,
are crucial for both the cohesion and the orientation of terri-
torial coalitions. If the objectives are very speciﬁc, sector-
based or short terms, the territorial coalition could face
greater obstacles to becoming a transformative territorial coa-
lition. The question of transformative territorial social action
is part of a long-standing debate over the extent to which
actors can deliberately modify their conditions of existence
and the extent to which inherited structural conditions limit
their freedom of action. In classic social theory, the problem
refers to the famous phrase by Karl Marx, that “men make
their own history, but they do not make it just as they please
in circumstances they choose for themselves; rather they make
it in present circumstances, given and inherited” (Marx 1996,
p. 32). In more contemporary social theory, various authors
(Bourdieu, 1977, 1990; Giddens, 1984; White, 2008) have writ-
ten about the complex interaction and feedback between
“agency” and “social structures” and have developed their
own conceptual solutions. Bourdieu’s theory of practice
includes the concepts of “practical sense,” “habitus” and
“ﬁelds,” by which the external becomes internalized and vice
versa (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).
Giddens (1984) emphasizes structure and routine in society,
based on a dual structure (agency/structure), which Bourdieu
rejects as a false dichotomy (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).
White also rejects the dichotomy between agency and struc-
ture, especially emphasizing the way in which identity and pat-
terns of social relationships organize the social world (White,
2008). Neoinstitutionalist theory also revisits this problem in
its debate over institutional change. Mahoney and Thelen
(2010), for example, state that “change agents” cannot be sep-
arated easily from the institutions they seek to modify. The
characteristics of both the political context and the institutions
in question would inﬂuence the type of change agents that
exist, and they, in turn, would inﬂuence the type of institu-
tional change. In other words, change agents are embedded
within the context in which they act and from which they drive
the desired transformations.
The argument with which we intervene in this long-standing
theoretical debate is that the actors’ deliberate, coordinated,
and planned action plays a minor role in the conﬁguration
of rural territorial dynamics in the territories analyzed. Inher-
ited structural factors and previous history weighed more
heavily. This does not mean that history is decisive, but history
matters, because it is very diﬃcult for actors who share a com-
mon cause to try to change those historical pathways when the
conditions under which they act are not conducive to change.
Collective eﬀorts to change historical pathways should there-
fore consider the importance of critical junctures (Pierson,
2004), where fractures or disjunctions occur that can leverage
coordinated and deliberate action. In other words, at these
critical junctures it is more clearly possible to forge a path in
a new direction.
We address the research question through a comparative
analysis of three cases of rural territorial dynamics (RTDs)
in Ecuador. The ﬁrst RTD takes place in the province of Tun-
gurahua, in the country’s central highlands, a territory of
nearly half a million inhabitants, half of whom live in rural
areas. The case of Tungurahua was crucial for the conceptual-
ization of the Rural Territorial Dynamics program, because it
has evolved around all of the ﬁve factors identiﬁed reported in
this volume by Berdegue´, Escobal, and Bebbington since atleast the last decades of the 19th century. Its economy is based
on small-scale agriculture and highly diversiﬁed rural manu-
facturing, consisting of a large number of small enterprises,
a rural–urban network of markets that connects local produc-
ers with extraterritorial markets, and a well-developed road
system that has been expanding at least since the mid-20th
century, when the province’s capital city became a hub for eco-
nomic exchange between Quito and Guayaquil, Ecuador’s two
largest cities.
The other two RTDs analyzed, which are located in two
rural territories in the western part of the province of Loja,
in Ecuador’s southern highlands, oﬀer a signiﬁcant contrast:
the populations are smaller (50,000 and 10,000 inhabitants,
respectively, 90% of whom live in rural areas), and the territo-
rial economies are highly specialized in the production of corn
and coﬀee. In addition, the territorial coalitions originated in
transformations during the 1990s, and their activities are
based on explicit territorial plans and strategies, that is, on
the conscious coordination of activities by their actors, espe-
cially the powerful extraterritorial ones that are involved in
each of the two cases. In this region of the Ecuadorian Andes
access to dynamic markets and public infrastructure is very
recent compared to Tungurahua’s RTD. Local actors have
not had the opportunity or incentives to diversify their eco-
nomic activities or establish strong ties with an urban center.
The result is an economic structure that is highly dependent
on a single product and therefore much more vulnerable to
external shocks. We will argue that Loja’s territorial history
shows that isolation and inequality in access to productive
assets marked not only the structures that must be radically
modiﬁed, but also the very composition, capacity for action
and power resources of the coalition that drives change.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
methodology used to select and analyze the three RTDs. Sec-
tions 3 and 4 analyze the emergence and historical evolution of
the coalitions in Tungurahua. Section 5 focuses on the context
in which the transformative territorial coalitions emerged in
Loja and in their interaction with the other ﬁve factors that
are decisive for territorial dynamics. The last section discusses
the results of the comparative study from the standpoint of the
theoretical problems presented in this introduction.2. METHODOLOGY
The case studies consisted of two phases. In the ﬁrst one, a
series of maps was prepared tracing the evolution of three eco-
nomic variables: poverty, income inequality, and local per-
capita consumption in Ecuador during 1995–2006 (Larrea,
Landı´n, Andrande, Wrborich, & Fraga, 2008; Larrea,
Larrea, Andrade, & Maldonado, 2011). 3 Three rural territo-
ries that combined simultaneous improvements in the three
variables were selected. The second phase consisted in an anal-
ysis of the emergence and functioning of the RTDs, using a
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods.
In Tungurahua, a representative survey was carried out with
merchants in the Ambato Wholesale Market, the core of the
territory’s trade system, while in the territories in Loja, two
surveys were carried out with producers and traders of corn
and coﬀee. 4 The three case studies also included ethnographic
ﬁeldwork, interviews, focus groups, participatory observation
in workshops and assemblies of both producers and mer-
chants, as well as other qualitative methods. The economic
activities analyzed in this study were selected according to a
typology of rural parishes, which was based on 17 economic,
social, and demographic variables.
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nographic ﬁeldwork, interviews, focus groups, participatory
observation in workshops and assemblies of both producers
and merchants, as well as other qualitative methods. The ﬁeld-
work was conducted between June and December 2009 in
Tungurahua and between June and September 2010 in Loja.
The interviewees included businesspeople, representatives of
industry, peasant organizations, non-governmental organiza-
tions, local ﬁnancial institutions and agroindustry enterprises,
local government oﬃcials, academics, and qualiﬁed infor-
mants. Approximately 167 interviews, 11 ethnographies, and
four focus groups were conducted. Some of the qualitative
information was coded and analyzed in Nvivo (QSR
International, 2012), combining content analysis with a more
deductive approach based on the study’s guiding questions. 53. WHY HISTORY MATTERS IN TUNGURAHUA
The purpose of this section is to show that the RTD in
Tungurahua is based on an economic structure whose origin
and development cannot be attributed to the intentional and
coordinated actions of a “reﬂexive” territorial coalition
(Giddens, 1984). In other words, the processes and structures
underlying the RTD in Tungurahua were not the result of
actions that were coordinated or designed to produce an eﬀect
at a territorial scale. Rather we will show that the emergence
of a transformative territorial coalition in Tungurahua is the
path-dependent outcome of an evolution that began with
a particular set of economic transactions that decisively
inﬂuenced the fate of the territory.
To help to understand the set of factors that constitute the
path-dependent process, we will divide the case of Tungurahua
into four moments: 1870–90, 1920–30, 1940–80, and 1990–
2010. The ﬁrst moment occurred in the second half of the
19th century, when small- and medium-scale agricultural pro-
duction and commercialization expanded in Tungurahua, with
apples, pears, and plums as the main products. The key factor
in the emergence of the agro-commercial complex was access
to basic resources, such as land and water, by a large number
of small producers. The relatively balanced distribution of
agricultural land and irrigation water resulted from a redistri-
bution process that began in the last quarter of the 19th cen-
tury, and which became consolidated after 1930 (Ibarra,
1987). During this period, the land tenure structure in Tungu-
rahua was modiﬁed, mainly through the market and through
often-violent peasant resistance to eﬀorts by landholders to
concentrate land in a few hands. The number of estates con-
trolled by the ﬁve largest landowning families in the territory
decreased from 64 in the 1860s to 14 in 1930 (Marcha´n &
Andrade, 1986; as cited in Ibarra, 1987, p. 41). From early
on, small and mid-size farmers also had access to irrigation
water, because some landowners and merchants built irriga-
tion systems so they could divide and sell their land at a higher
price (Metais, 2000; Nu´n˜ez & Vega, 1992; Ruf, 2001, 2006).
The key element in this evolution, which has been rather infre-
quent in Ecuador’s agrarian history, is that while the process
of redistribution of land and access to water was occurring,
a system of rural markets expanded throughout the territory.
Thanks to that expansion, small farmers, transformed into
merchants, obtained the means necessary to purchase land.
The ﬁrst favorable conjuncture between territorial and extra-
territorial processes occurred during the cacao boom on the
coast in the late 19th century. During those years, demand
for agricultural products from the central highlands increased.
In the territory of Tungurahua, that growing demand mainlystimulated small producers and provided them with resources
to purchase more land and invest in irrigation infrastructure.
In short, concomitant with the expansion of the food market
in Ecuador’s coastal region, the number of large estates
decreased, and smallholding expanded.
The characteristics of this agro-commercial complex are cru-
cial for understanding the emergence and functioning of the
RTD. The data gathered during the ﬁeldwork and the review
of the secondary literature indicate that a large part of the sys-
tem of rural markets, which was centered in Ambato, the cap-
ital of the province, was created before 1900 (Bromley, 1975;
Hanssen-Bauer, 1982; Ospina et al., 2011). The early expan-
sion of a commercial network supplied by small farm produc-
tion provided the territory with a signiﬁcant group of
independent small-scale farmers who were closely tied to food
markets and inter-regional commerce. They were not small
farmers in an equitable structure in an isolated territory, as
occurred in the corn-growing territory of Loja, nor were they
small farmers dependent on an omnipresent system of tradi-
tional large estates, as in the coﬀee-growing region of Loja.
Rural–urban integration based on smallholder agriculture
through the continuing expansion of this particular commer-
cial structure has persisted over the decades, despite tendencies
toward concentration in favor of larger merchants. During the
ﬁeldwork in 2009, 60 weekly fairs were counted, distributed in
19 rural markets throughout the territory (Ospina et al., 2011).
In addition, the Ambato Wholesale Market, the system’s cen-
tral market and a warehousing and redistribution platform of
national signiﬁcance, includes 1,525 permanent vendor stalls
that operate ﬁve days a week (Hollenstein, 2011). The sec-
ond-largest wholesale market in the central highlands—
located south of Ambato in Riobamba, the capital of the
neighboring province of Chimborazo—has about 630 whole-
sale merchants and concentrates its activities in one day per
week.
Over time, the physical proximity of farms and spaces for
commercialization made it easier for the rural population,
especially women, to become merchants. The gradual but sub-
stantial inclusion of farm households through rural women’s
commercial activity can still be seen in the family histories
of wholesale merchants in Ambato: 87% of the market stalls
are managed by women, and a large percentage of their par-
ents (63%) and grandparents (79%) were dedicated to agricul-
ture and commerce (Hollenstein, 2011).
It was through this “symbiosis” between production and
commercialization (Martı´nez & North, 2009) that smallhold-
ers created stable commercial networks based on family and
community ties, resulting in a commercial structure less unfa-
vorable to small farms. In other words, the “strong ties”
(Granovetter, 1973) resulting from family and community
bonds are accompanied by a series of norms and rules that
govern exchange and income redistribution in a relatively
more equitable manner. This is clearly seen when family net-
works in Tungurahua are compared with agricultural trade
in Riobamba. Burgos (1997 [1970]), for example shows that
a strong ethnic cleavage separated indigenous producers from
urban merchants, most of whom were white or mestizos.
Burgos (1997 [1970]) argues that the ethnic cleavage in the
rural commercial system formed the basis of a social structure
called “internal colonialism,” which concentrated agricultural
surplus in the hands of urban elites of Riobamba.
It is important to note that the particular commercial rural–
urban network in Tungurahua was not only the result of the
everyday social interaction between small farmers and urban
merchants, but also the adaptation of the formal rules that
governed these transactions. One institutional aspect of major
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tial–temporal pattern of rural and urban fairs, after the main
market day in Ambato was changed from Sunday to Monday.
Originally considered a compromise between conﬂicting inter-
ests of the Catholic Church and the municipal government, the
institutional change gave the rural/urban commercial network
competitive advantages, enabling it to further expand
throughout the territory.
A second key moment in the consolidation of the social
underpinnings of the territorial coalition in Tungurahua
occurred in the 1920s and 1930s. A new food price increase
in Ecuador, this time due to the cacao crisis and a lack of
the hard currency needed to sustain imports, revived brutal
competition for land resources. By that time, however, inde-
pendent smallholders already had the strength to resist the
interests of latifundistas and the material means to support
themselves, and they were suﬃciently autonomous to avoid
dispossession from above. 6 Small farmers therefore contrib-
uted to the conservation of a tenure structure that had been
under construction during the previous half-century. Without
the successful resistance by powerful and independent small-
holders who were connected with markets, the price increases,
and the expansion of food trade with the coast during the early
decades of the 20th century would have beneﬁted social and
economic actors other than the small farmers, muleteers,
and merchants.
The years during 1950–80 constituted a third moment in
which the agro-commercial complex contributed to the consol-
idation of Ambato’s growth and to rural economic diversiﬁca-
tion, representing a Latin American variant of the Third Italy
(Bagnasco, 1977, 1988) and Taiwan (Ho, 1979, 1982). Thanks
to the persistence of independent smallholders who were
linked with markets, but who also had become merchants,
the economy diversiﬁed toward manufacturing based on small
family enterprises. The new elements of the rural non-farm
economy included textile production (producers of jeans in
Pelileo were studied by Martı´nez and North (2009) and
North (2008)), metal mechanics (specializing in the manufac-
turing of vehicles, a crucial complementary service), leather
production and shoemaking, furniture, musical instruments,
and food processing (Hollenstein & Ospina, 2011). As a result,
today the rural population active in manufacturing sectors is
considerably higher (15%) than in neighboring provinces,
where it barely reaches 7%, or in Loja, where it stands at less
than 5% (Larrea, Landı´n et al., 2011).
It is important to note that while many of these sectors are
almost exclusively built on small rural family businesses,
some activities, such as the metal-mechanic sector, depend
on large industrial enterprises managed by a relatively pow-
erful industrial class in Ambato. Even in the case of urban
industry, however, metal-mechanic activities function as a
cluster, oﬀering many (rural) workshops the possibility of
providing parts to large chassis assemblers (Hollenstein &
Ospina, 2014).
As in the previous key moments, the particular structure of
the territorial economy is not only the result of “brute” eco-
nomic forces, but is also the consequence of particular forms
of social interaction governed by institutional arrangements
between economic actors. The importance of the latter mani-
fests itself in the spatial pattern of the various economic sec-
tors in Tungurahua. First, a set of centripetal forces, which
can be explained by the core-periphery model developed by
Krugman (1991), have led to the concentration of manufactur-
ing and industrial clusters in Tungurahua (and not in other
provinces of the central highlands). The spatial distributionof productive activities within the province of Tungurahua,
however, reveals the existence of centrifugal forces that create
a strong decentralization toward the agricultural periphery of
Ambato (Hollenstein & Ospina, 2011). Interviews and ﬁeld
observations indicate that the location of the agricultural fairs
mentioned above and the sites of rural manufacturing overlap
substantially, suggesting that the productive and commercial
networks in the agriculture sector have aided the expansion
of manufacturing, because the latter is socially “embedded”
(Granovetter, 1985, 2005; Krippner et al., 2004) in the former.
In addition, diversiﬁcation toward manufacturing production
in rural areas has always occurred in spaces delimited by the
presence of determinate rural communities. The expansion
of the shoemaking industry, for example, has occurred several
times since the 1960s, but the successive expansions occurred
in distant places within the territory rather than in a single spe-
cialized and spatially concentrated location (Hollenstein &
Ospina, 2011). There are also indications that social learning
processes disseminated the necessary knowledge for produc-
tive diversiﬁcation through the networks once centered on
agricultural production and commercialization (see also
Bagnasco, 1977, 1988; North, 2005).
The distinctive gender pattern of the diversiﬁcation process
is yet another example of the social norms that lead the terri-
torial coalitions. Women play a key role as promoters of pro-
ductive diversiﬁcation and economic innovation in
Tungurahua. Surveys and interviews indicate that the smallest
and least proﬁtable economic activities, as well as start-ups,
are managed by women (Ospina, Alvarado et al., 2012;
Ospina et al., 2011). Hence, women often participate in
innovation processes geared toward productive diversiﬁcation.
Precisely because of their subordinate role in overall social
relationships, they are responsible for creating complementary
income sources in the form of small, autonomous, experimen-
tal businesses and small, riskier activities with uncertain
economic outcomes. In short, a large number of “rules of
exchange” (Fligstein, 2001), determining who is allowed to
exchange goods and knowledge with whom, seemed to govern
the spontaneous coalitions during the ﬁrst three moments of
the RTD in Tungurahua.
Despite the importance of the internal social, economic, and
institutional conﬁguration, the Tungurahua RTD would not
have followed its distinct development pathwithout the positive
eﬀects of several exogenous processes on the territory’s eco-
nomic apparatus. These processes include Ecuador’s economic
policies, based on the import substitution industrialization (ISI)
model, which was inﬂuential in fostering diversiﬁcation of pro-
duction in the territory. Beginning in the 1950s, tariﬀs protected
domestic small and mid-size industries against international
competition, and other state programs created ﬁnancial incen-
tives to encourage small businesses and crafts (for comparative
purposes, seeHirschman, 1963). The beginning of the extractive
oil industry in 1972 and the subsequent ﬁnancial bonanza were
key elements in the development of state-controlled economic
incentives.
An essential ﬁnding though is that the same policies did not
result in the diversiﬁcation of manufacturing in the rest of the
country’s rural areas in the highlands. 7 They did, however,
give impetus to new manufacturing activities in Tungurahua,
where the commercial networks and small producers could
take advantage of new opportunities. The metal mechanics
sector, which is now a core element of the territory’s economy,
emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, when there was also an
expansion of small-scale shoemaking in Cevallos and jeans
manufacturing in Pelileo (Martı´nez & North, 2009).
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nated way, with actors taking advantage of everyday opportu-
nities created by successive conjunctures and their
accumulation over at least four generations. A detailed exam-
ination shows that in each of these conjunctures, there was
room for reversing the successful path of territorial develop-
ment. Large landholders could have recovered land and water
in the 1920s and 1930s, and then the rural food market could
have been monopolized by large merchants. In all of these
alternative scenarios, the import substitution policies would
have beneﬁted large landowners and corporations instead of
small family enterprises.
Detailed analysis also shows that the transformation of
pre-existing structural conditions before and during several
conjunctures occurred not in a consciously coordinated
manner, but through the accumulative eﬀect of individual
actions during 1870–1930. In the following decades, the
territorial coalition protected its resources and expanded
its opportunities through the diversiﬁcation of family
enterprises toward manufacturing. The distinct productive
structure of Tungurahua’s RTD is not the result of coordi-
nated or planned actions, but arose from the cumulative
and aggregate action of scattered individual and family
strategies shaped by the spatial distribution of the
agro-commercial complex. Neither the spatial distribution
of the territorial economy, nor the type of new activities,
nor the organization based on small enterprises nor
industrial clusters were consciously planned with any sort
of joint calculation.
This is why we suggest that during successive key moments
after its initial moment in the late 19th century, the territorial
coalition in Tungurahua followed a development path that
stemmed from previous economic structures. It did not change
the RTD’s basic vectors, but contributed to the expansion of
many of the development opportunities contained within the
original structure. Along the way, the actors, who were mem-
bers of the transformative territorial coalition, diversiﬁed and
constructed themselves in the process of creating the territory
in which they lived.
Nevertheless, the main actors of the RTD deserve to be
called a territorial coalition because they acted in convergence
over a long period of time, although with a high degree of
organizational dispersion and the “spontaneity” of their
actions. In this sense, the coalition was tacit until the late
20th century, because only under exceptional conditions did
it achieve explicit coordination, as occurred during the crisis
caused by the 1949 earthquake in Ambato (Hollenstein &
Ospina, 2014).4. THE EMERGENCE OF A REFLEXIVE
TERRITORIAL COALITION
The fourth moment in Tungurahua’s RTD occurred when
the nature of the transformative territorial coalition changed
radically because of an exogenous shock to the territorial
economy. After this moment, which occurred in the 1980s
and more clearly in the 1990s, some of Tungurahua’s vectors
of success underwent signiﬁcant readjustments. The most
important transformation was unquestionably the replace-
ment of the economic protection by neoliberal policies, with
a subsequent reduction and/or elimination of various stimuli
for domestic industry and agriculture. Trade liberalization,
the dollarization of the Ecuadorian economy in 2000, and
political instability beginning in 1995, had drastic eﬀects on
Tungurahua’s rural craft- and agriculture-based economy,but also on the businesses of the commercial and industrial
elites in Ambato. 8
Although social diﬀerentiation became more accentuated, it
is notable, given the magnitude of the change, that the
province has been relatively unscathed (Larrea, Landı´n
et al., 2011; Larrea, Larrea et al., 2011), as the territory did
not lose its main economic or social characteristics. One
important factor in this resilience is that large numbers of fam-
ily enterprises developed strategies for productive reconver-
sion. Textile producers, for example, became merchants of
imported products, which they had produced before the crisis
(Martı´nez & North, 2009). Blackberries, strawberries, chick-
ens, and greenhouse-grown tree tomatoes began to replace
products aﬀected by cheaper imports such as fruits from Chile
and garlic from China (Hollenstein & Ospina, 2014). Other
economic activities such as rural savings and loan cooperatives
grew exponentially.
Because of the severity of the economic crisis, however, the
productive reconversion, which followed the pattern of spon-
taneous actions of previous periods, was insuﬃcient. In fact,
the economic disruptions and readjustments led, for the ﬁrst
time in the province’s history, to a “territorial coalition” that
identiﬁes itself as such, competes politically and is explicitly
guided by a political program that proposes speciﬁc economic
strategies and policies for the territory. The Provincial Gov-
ernment of Tungurahua (PGT) emerged in the ﬁrst decade
of the 21st century as the leader and most visible expression
of this coalition of social actors.
Institutional innovations under the umbrella of the PGT’s
‘New Management Model’ (NMG) are profound and aﬀect
the form of political representation, which is based mainly
on organized social groups from the private sector, civil soci-
ety, and various social movements, such as the indigenous
movement. Decision-making processes and strategic planning
tools break down barriers between the public and private sec-
tors, creating consultation processes and venues for interac-
tion and negotiation of policies. In other words, the NMG
seeks to create an appropriate environment for the manage-
ment and systematic development of the local economy (see
Gangotena, 2011; PGT, 2007a, 2007b, 2010, 2011;
Herna´ndez, 2008, 2009; Hollenstein & Ospina, 2014).
Importantly, unlike the tacit coalition that dominated terri-
torial development during the 20th century, the PGT repre-
sents an intentional eﬀort to coordinate the development
projects of various social and economic sectors in the territory.
The main objective is to replace the system of protections lost
in the 1990s with a more or less interconnected set of territorial
policies to promote development, agreements with the central
government for ﬁnancing infrastructure, and an eﬀort to win
other agreements to reestablish certain tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ
protections in key industries in the territory such as the
metal-mechanic sector and the shoemaking and textile indus-
tries (Hollenstein & Ospina, 2014).
In short, the institutional reforms carried out by the PGT
were aimed “toward an economic development model that
tried to ﬁll the void left by the termination of developmental-
ism and ISI policies” (Hollenstein & Ospina, 2014, p. 209). In
the economic sphere, the PGT developed a sort of “Fordist
model” that aims to promote (local) consumption through
“decent” labor conditions and an eﬀort to improve the quality
of local production to gain access to new market niches. The
programs and strategies designed with a “bottom-up” plan-
ning methodology include: (i) the “Tungurahua Agricultural
Strategy” (2007), aimed at small and mid-size agriculture, (ii)
the “Fund for Managing Pa´ramos 9 and Fighting Poverty in
Tungurahua” (2008), (iii) the “Tungurahua Tourism Strategy”
90 WORLD DEVELOPMENT(2009), and the “Productivity and Competitiveness Agenda,”
which seeks to maintain/improve links between large busi-
nesses and small enterprises through the implementation of
clusters (2010). 10
Although some immediate political circumstances, such as
widespread resistance against several long-standing local poli-
ticians during the 1990s, coincided with this change in the ter-
ritorial coalition, it is necessary to focus on the deeper aspects
of the transformation. As had occurred earlier in the RTD, the
exogenous crisis during the 1990s, which can be understood as
yet another critical juncture (Pierson, 2004), meant that local
actors found themselves at a new crossroads with several
options. At that key moment, the territory’s history func-
tioned as a sort of guidepost that led the actors to move in
one direction instead of another. The most important guide-
post was the belief expressed by political actors that there
was no possibility of overcoming the province’s structural dif-
ﬁculties with economic initiatives that excluded particular
social sectors. Concretely, the actors in the local coalition—
small farmers, artisans, small industrial entrepreneurs, and
merchants—were strong enough by the 1990s to become veto
players (Tsebelis, 2002), whose exclusion from the economic
model could have led to serious social conﬂict and massive
unemployment.
Our interviews indicate that Ambato’s business elite played
a key role in shaping the explicit or “reﬂexive” territorial coa-
lition, as their own economic strategy in the recent past (pro-
moting local production instead of extraterritorial investment)
forced them “not only to ﬁnd mechanisms for overcoming the
crisis of production in the territory, but also to acknowledge
the demands and needs of sectors that were less powerful
but not irrelevant in the territorial power game” (Hollenstein
& Ospina, 2014, p. 213). The various economic programs men-
tioned above, however, also indicate that the “not irrelevant
sectors” had enough power to demand that they be included.
In summary, the critical juncture of the 1990s was an acid
test for the RTD. Except for some exceptional situations, such
as the Ambato earthquake in 1949, this crisis marked the ﬁrst
time in the history of the territory that a “reﬂexive territorial
coalition” sought to save and renew the RTD. It is telling that
the PGT sought to achieve this not so much by changing pre-
existing structures as by protecting the development dynamic
from external and internal events that could potentially dis-
rupt its success.5. WHY HISTORY MATTERS IN LOJA
Unlike the case of Tungurahua, the two RTDs in Loja are
of recent origin and revolve around a single value chain. The
ﬁrst territory in Loja specializes in coﬀee production and the
second in corn, which is mainly used to produce animal feed
for chickens and pigs. Both territories evolved rapidly in the
late 20th century because of rising coﬀee prices in international
markets and the growing domestic demand for corn. Yet, the
decisive factor for stimulating the two RTD were nascent ter-
ritorial coalitions that emerged from several groups of actors
involved in the two value chains. In both cases, the dynamics
have a broad local social base and small farmers are grouped
in many local associations.
Like Tungurahua, both territories in Loja have registered
dynamic economic processes with a considerable degree of
social inclusion, although with less social equality as in the for-
mer case. 11 Their present and future success, however,
depends on a very diﬀerent historical evolution than that ana-
lyzed in the preceding sections. The reasons for the verydiﬀerent development path are (i) the fact that the two territo-
ries could take advantage of only one of the ﬁve factors pro-
posed by Berdegue´ et al. (2012) and discussed in this volume
by Berdegue´, Escobal, and Bebbington—better access to
dynamic markets—along with the emergence of a territorial
coalition, however recent, ii) the absence of critical junctures
(apart from the recent price hike) that spurred the local
economic development.
The two RTDs in Loja are embedded in a historical context
with characteristics very diﬀerent from those of Tungurahua.
The agro-commercial complex of Tungurahua, based on con-
stant positive feedback between small-scale productive and
commercial structures, never emerged in Loja for two reasons:
ﬁrst, because the agrarian structure was dominated by a small
number of traditional large estates, and second, because the
commercial system was controlled by a local elite settled in
what we could call rural cities. In this, the RTDs in Loja more
closely resemble rural territories in Latin America that seek to
break out of the social inertia of a past that oﬀers little hope.
Comparing them with Tungurahua, therefore, could shed light
on the problems that other rural territories in similar condi-
tions may encounter in their eﬀorts to forge inclusive and equi-
table economic dynamics.
The land and commercial structure tightly controlled by the
local elite strongly discouraged small-scale agricultural pro-
duction and limited the spatial mobility and the autonomous
connection of rural families with expanding urban markets.
The two territories in Loja are located in a region that had
been physically and economically isolated from national devel-
opment since Ecuador’s independence, as the borders with
Peru became a constant source of military tension (Ospina,
Hollenstein, & Poma, 2012). Only two badly maintained roads
connected the two territories intermittently with Cuenca and
Guayaquil, and the internal road system was almost non-exis-
tent (Bromley & Bromley, 1976). In both territories, the only
markets accessible for small farmers were located in the two
canton capitals—Cariamanga in the coﬀee RTD and Pindal
in the corn RTD. Alternative wholesale markets not con-
trolled by the local commercial elite were beyond the reach
of small producers, not only because of high transportation
costs, but also because of uncertainty about prices and lack
of stable, trustworthy commercial contacts (Ospina, Andrade
et al., 2012). No city similar to Ambato was established in
or near the two territories in Loja where canton capitals func-
tioned as the urban center of a system of internal colonialism
based on the economic exploitation of their hinterland
(Bromley, 1980). Needless to say, diﬀerences in scale and pop-
ulation have crucial implications for the political power of ter-
ritorial coalitions and opportunities for diversifying economic
structures. Nevertheless, these diﬀerences are a by-product of
corresponding development paths: it was Ambato’s commer-
cial centrality that allowed rapid urban growth (Bromley,
1980) where before there had been only a small, semi-rural
town not very diﬀerent from the two canton capitals of the
Loja RTDs.
Because of its geographic isolation, Loja is one of the prov-
inces with the least diversiﬁed productive apparatus. In 2001,
the economically active population involved in rural manufac-
turing was barely 5%, one-third that of Tungurahua. Family
farming employs very few wage earners, and women engage
in few economic activities outside of the home or family farm
(Ospina, Andrade et al., 2012).
This clear specialization pattern has persisted and has even
been reinforced with the RTDs centered on corn and coﬀee.
Productive specialization in the corn-producing territory has
reached such an extreme that it has begun to worry political
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have taken initial steps to diversify marketing systems with
other organic products, such as the chirimoya fruit. Certain
warning signals, such as the drop in coﬀee prices in 2012 or
the liberalization of corn imports, which produced a decrease
in prices and a debt crisis in 2009, reveal the dynamics’ vulner-
ability to external destabilizing economic events.
Regarding the formation of territorial coalitions in Loja, the
long-standing social and economic structures shaped a peasant
population very diﬀerent from the small-scale farmers of Tun-
gurahua: either they were smallholders in a balanced tenure
structure, but isolated from extraterritorial markets (the
corn-producing territory), or they were small farmers depen-
dent on a system of large estates (coﬀee-producing territory).
They were not small farmers who had become merchants
and who accumulated economic and political capital. Unlike
Tungurahua, the two territories in Loja did not receive major
investment in public infrastructure during most of the 20th
century. Investment in roads only expanded with the oil boom
that began in 1972 (Pietri-Le´vy, 1995; PREDESUR, 1980),
but by then they no longer had the same catalyzing eﬀect.
Given these circumstances, none of the causal chains or crit-
ical conjunctures (Pierson, 2004) that strengthened the RTD in
Tungurahua could gain a foothold in the territories in Loja. It
is not surprising, therefore, that the change that led to eco-
nomic vitalization in the territory occurred at the initiative
of extraterritorial actors. In other words, the economic history
of the two territories made it extremely likely that only an
exogenous shock would be able to destabilize the power rela-
tionships forged during decades of economic stagnation. Not
even the very large waves of migration experienced by the
entire province could destroy from within the vestiges of a past
built on large landholdings and exploitation by commercial
elites in the towns.
The external shock that led to the birth of the RTDs in Loja
occurred in the two territories with the sudden appearance of a
series of extraterritorial actors connected with the increase in
coﬀee prices in the global market and the growing demand
for hard corn for industrial-scale chicken and egg production.
With support from local agricultural producers, these extrater-
ritorial actors began to reorganize the systems for production
and commercialization of the two products. In the corn-pro-
ducing territory, the external actors were agroindustrial enter-
prises, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), banks and
savings and loan cooperatives, as well as merchants from out-
side the province. In the coﬀee-producing territory, on the
other hand, the list of extraterritorial actors includes a market-
ing company, several NGOs, international development agen-
cies, and organic coﬀee roasters in Italy, Germany, France,
and the United States (Ospina, Andrade et al., 2012).
The new territorial economic dynamics appeared on the
most superﬁcial level as technological changes induced by
agents working for outside buyers, signiﬁcantly increasing
the productivity of the two production systems. Small coﬀee
farmers, organized in producer associations, began growing
certiﬁed organic coﬀee in high altitude with diversiﬁed produc-
tion systems that used natural shade, increased the use of post-
harvest technology and were able to sell their product at a
higher price in international organic coﬀee markets. By 2010,
41% of the approximately 1,000 coﬀee-producing households
had adopted the new technological method. Corn producers
began to replace native seeds with hybrid varieties and com-
bined them in a technological package consisting of a series
of agrochemicals and artiﬁcial fertilizers typical of the “green
revolution”. During the harvest of 2010, 90% of the 2,000corn-producing households in Pindal had adopted the new
technological method (Ospina, Andrade et al., 2012).
A decade after the new economic dynamics began, a new
intermediation structure oﬀered access to new markets (global,
as in the case of coﬀee, or domestic, as in the case of corn).
Although the new intermediation structure could not eliminate
the traditional commercial system entirely, it created enough
pressure to shift the balance of bargaining power between local
merchants and small farmers in favor of the latter. 12 A decade
after they began, the RTDs now consist of a mixture of new
commercial channels and end markets, a new technological
form of production, and price structures, and negotiation that
are more beneﬁcial for small producers (Ospina, Andrade
et al., 2012).
One essential aspect of the contrast with the RTD in Tungu-
rahua is that these new coalitions have had an explicit territo-
rial “project” since the RTD’s beginnings in the late 1990s.
The territoriality of the coalitions’ projects is most clearly
expressed in the words of extraterritorial actors, not least
because there is a marked diﬀerence in economic, political,
and symbolic capital between local and extraterritorial actors
(see Ospina, Bebbington, Hollenstein, Nussbaum, & Ramı´rez,
2012). The territorial “project” corresponds to their values and
economic interests and is based on a speciﬁc proposal for insti-
tutional and economic transformation, although that does not
necessarily imply a complete and detailed design. In other
words, they are “reﬂexive” coalitions (Giddens, 1984).
In the case of the corn-producing territory, a legislator from
Loja who was well connected with regional banks, agroindus-
trial corporations, and local agronomists, explained how the
“corn initiative” began by assembling a coalition of economic
partners:
I knew that [the agroindustry company] purchased corn and that the
[corn-producing] area sold it. A cousin of mine who works at [agroin-
dustry company X] put me in touch with engineer Y [currently pur-
chasing manager for agroindustry company X]. [Later] we went to
the Banco de Loja. I am a close friend of the manager and owner.
[Agroindustry company X] explained to them that the business was
proﬁtable and that it already had similar agreements in other areas.
If [small farmers] paid 10 percent before, how would they not pay
1.5 percent [in interest] a month? [. . .]. I used to be manager of [a pub-
lic–private enterprise], so I had many contacts there [in the province of
Loja]. When I was in the legislature, I always kept [agricultural engi-
neer B] as political chief [in the corn-producing territory]. He is the
heart of the [corn-purchasing] program (interview conducted by Nata-
lia Za´rate, Quito, July 16, 2010).
Besides the original triad of a provincial bank, an agroindus-
try company, and local engineers, second-tier organizations of
corn producers and NGOs have taken advantage of this initial
surge to expand their activities around the production and sale
of corn (Ospina, Andrade et al., 2012). The ﬁeldwork and inter-
views show that the corn value chain, as a development model,
is part of the discourse of both the local population and extra-
territorial actors. It is no accident that promotional material
for Pindal, the capital of the territory, proclaims the municipal-
ity the “corn capital” of Ecuador.
Nonetheless, the interviews also reveal conﬂictive relation-
ships. During the ﬁeldwork, the local government, with sup-
port from some corn producers’ associations and NGOs,
tried to establish a program both to replace Green Revolu-
tion-style technology packages with a production system that
was less dependent on agrochemicals and to diversify rural
economies toward sugar cane cultivation. Importantly, the
local conﬂicts show that although the corn value chain
weakened the territory’s economic isolation by bringing
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emerging territorial coalition has not yet stabilized. Deep
disagreements about the future direction of the territory (single
crop vs. agricultural diversiﬁcation) give reason to question
whether that will ever occur (see Ospina, Andrade et al., 2012).
The actors in the coﬀee-growing territory also coalesce
around the idea of improving the production and marketing
system throughout the value chain. The coalition formed by
coﬀee producers, their production and marketing associations,
NGOs, savings and loan cooperatives, and organic roasters
seeks to establish organic coﬀee as the economic platform on
which to base other productive plans for the territory, such
as the production of chirimoya or agrotourism (interview with
a representative of coﬀee producers, Espı´ndola, April 4, 2010,
and Ospina, Andrade et al., 2012). Unlike the case of corn,
however, there is more consensus about the opportunity for
producing high-quality coﬀee. For example, the fact that social
groups responsible for the territory’s economic stagnation,
such as traditional merchants, have joined the dynamic by cre-
ating productive conversion alternatives for coﬀee producers is
not seen by coﬀee producers’ associations as a threat to the
overall dynamic. Instead, they welcome the fact that traditional
merchants have been forced to oﬀer better prices because of
competition from commercial associations of coﬀee producers
(interview with the vice president of a commercial organiza-
tion, Loja, March 29, 2010).6. CONCLUSIONS
This article compares three territorial dynamics led by
“transformative territorial coalitions” with very diﬀerent his-
tories. In Tungurahua, the territorial coalition was tacit during
most of its history, formed slowly more than a century ago
and had almost no extraterritorial members. Because of an
exogenous shock, however, the tacit coalition very recently
became explicit and has implemented signiﬁcant institutional
reforms. In comparison, the two territorial coalitions in Loja
emerged recently, barely a decade ago, at the initiative of pow-
erful extraterritorial agents. Since their beginning, the corn
and coﬀee coalitions have been based on a clear-cut, though
rather conﬂictive, territorial “project”.
This paper’s theoretical question referred to the weight of
conscious, voluntary agency in setting the course for rural
territorial dynamics. The most important aspect, from this
standpoint, is whether intentional actions in the form of a
territorial “project” on the part of the coalition actors are
an “important advantage” for constructing an inclusive and
equitable RTD (Ferna´ndez et al. 2014, p. 24). The main
empirical conclusion of the comparison presented here is that
the existence of an explicit territorial project in Loja was not
enough of an advantage to compensate for the disadvantages
of an economic and social history in which structural factors
weighed against it. In Tungurahua, economic structures and
the balance of power among actors tended “spontaneously”
to reproduce conditions in which markets, a commercial city
and economic diversiﬁcation emerged, so that it was possible
for local actors to take advantage of public policies for the
expansion of infrastructure or the protection of domestic
production. In Loja, on the other hand, the economic struc-
tures and the balance of power among actors tended “spon-
taneously” to reproduce isolation, multiplying obstacles to
economic diversiﬁcation, market growth, and the emergence
of dynamic commercial cities. In this context, therefore,“spontaneous” means consistency and automatic adaptation
of new economic processes to the previously existing struc-
tures. In the conceptualization of Bourdieu (1990), such
automatic adaptation is the result of habitus, a set of dispo-
sitions that “tend to generate practices objectively compatible
with these conditions and expectations pre-adapted to their
objective demands [. . .]” (p. 63). 13
What are the favorable “conditions” in Tungurahua that
tended to reproduce themselves “spontaneously,” and which
did not exist in Loja? First, there was a relatively equitable
land and water tenure structure that combined early on with
exposure of small farmers to a dynamic market for food
goods, which led them to become locally based muleteers
and merchants. Second, that agrarian structure could be con-
served because of active resistance by smallholders, despite a
period in the 1930s during which there was a looming danger
of reconcentration of property. Those smallholders were well
positioned to take advantage of the opportunity of “diﬀuse
industrialization” (Bagnasco, 1988) 14 promoted by
import-substitution policies, government incentives, and pro-
tections for domestic production. It was thanks to this more
balanced social and economic power structure, combined
with the leveraging of a series of critical junctures, that the
dynamic of territorial economic growth tended to be more
equitable.
In recent years, however, actors in the coalitions in both
Loja and Tungurahua have proposed explicit territorial pro-
jects. In Loja, they sought to transform previous structural
conditions and reinvigorate local agricultural production. In
the coﬀee-producing area, extraterritorial environmentalist
actors incorporated the dimensions of ecological protection,
strengthening of organizations and socio-economic equity into
their vision of the territory. In the corn-producing region,
extraterritorial business actors had more limited objectives
of promoting the production of a raw material necessary for
their own business. In Tungurahua, the coalition proposed a
proactive defense of diversiﬁed local production conditions
in a liberalized economic context in which they no longer
could take advantage of state protection. Consciously coordi-
nated action brought about signiﬁcant changes in the three
territories. But the changes in the territories in Loja, which
resulted from reﬂexive social action, seem more vulnerable
and there are more uncertainties about their sustainability
over time. The reason is not just their starting point—the
structural conditions on which they act have a more special-
ized and limited base of production—but the fact that the
nature and power of the local actors who are members of
the territorial coalition are diﬀerent. Here, too, history carries
signiﬁcant weight.
The natures of the local actors who make up the transfor-
mative coalition vary depending on the pre-existing structures
that condition their capacity to create new dynamics. The
farmer-merchants of Tungurahua are not the same as the
small farmers of Loja. While the former traveled throughout
the country, participated in markets, and established business
contacts with external markets and actors throughout the
country to attract them to their territory, the latter migrated
as laborers to work temporarily or permanently in businesses
established and managed by external actors. The small farmer-
merchants of Tungurahua had know-how, trade networks,
social capital and economic capital to invest in their own
enterprises, while the small farmers in Loja lacked these criti-
cal resources. The balance of power, control over political and
economic initiative, and bargaining power of these two types
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the same.
The extent to which deliberate action by coalitions can lead
to lasting and radical change in inherited conditions depends
on the power that actors of the coalition have accumulated
over time. This means that, to a great extent, conscious eﬀort
comes after—or, with luck, at the same time as—structural
change. As discussed in the introductory article of this collec-
tion (Berdegue´, Bebbington, & Escobal, 2015), structures are
not monolithic, however, but are varied and intrinsically con-
tradictory, which creates various opportunities for action,
which actors can take advantage of to choose among diﬀerent
historical options. In short, the social, political and economic
capacities of territorial coalitions during critical junctures
seem to pave the way for maintaining the advantages accumu-
lated in the past or for breaking their spell. In any path depen-
dency, there is plenty of room for uncertainty (North, 2005).Does this mean the Owl of Minerva must always spread its
wings at dusk, when the storm has passed? Does it mean
there is no need to plan and to try to navigate as consciously
as possible amid everything that we cannot control in the
world? In order to only acknowledge such a historical deter-
minism, we suggest that one promising option is to orient
economic planning according to the lessons learned from
the past: better distribution of productive assets leads to
more balanced power relationships in social struggles, polit-
ical debates and, ﬁnally, to more inclusive economic projects.
For rural territories, this process begins, more often than
not, with the redistribution of land and water. To paraphrase
Marx, much can be learned from those few cases, such as
that of Tungurahua, in which “the tradition of all dead gen-
erations” does not weigh “like a nightmare on the brains of
the living” (1996, p. 32), but endures as the dream of a
brighter future.NOTES1. The Rural Territorial Dynamics Program was led by Rimisp-Centro
Latinoamericano para el Desarrollo Rural and included studies in 11
countries.
2. Isolated actors, even powerful ones, have diﬃculty marking and
deﬁning a development path.
3. The maps were made using the small area estimation method (Elbers,
Lanjouw, & Lanjouw, 2003, 2005). The PovMap 2.0 application was used
(Larrea et al., 2008).
4. The survey in the Ambato Wholesale Market included 465 of a total of
1,524 merchants. The survey in the coﬀee-producing territory covered 327
productive units (UPA) of a total of approximately 1,000 coﬀee-producing
households, and in the corn-producing territory, interviews were done
with 393 UPA of a total of 1,800. The two commercial subsystems were
analyzed using the social network analysis method (see Modrego &
Sanclemente, 2007). Coﬀee and corn prices and volumes by sales channel
were calculated using SPSS 17 (SPSS, 2008), and the visual analysis was
done using Ucinet and NetDraw (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). A
detailed explanation of the method used to create the typology of parishes
can be found in Larrea, Landı´n et al. (2011).
5. The interviews lasted between 45 and 90 min. The ethnographic work
varied substantially in duration. The shortest lasted a week and involved
living with two families of coﬀee-growing farmers. The longest lasted ﬁve
months.
6. Ibarra (1987), who studied these conﬂicts in detail, concludes that
“they were isolated uprisings and protests that did not seek to question the
gamonal order,” but were “defensive” movements (p. 80) that aimed to
avoid the expansion of large landholdings.
7. As Kay (2002) argues convincingly in his work on agrarian reforms in
Latin America and East Asia, reforms carried out before stimulating
industrialization, as occurred in some East Asian countries, lead to a more
successful model than those that happen in the reverse order
(industrialization ﬁrst and then agrarian reform), which were more
frequently implemented in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. The
outcome deﬁnitely would have been diﬀerent if the agrarian structure had
been changed later, as occurred in the coﬀee-producing territory of Loja,
with the agrarian reforms of 1964 and 1973. Diversiﬁcation towardmanufacturing was therefore possible because of a previous step that
enabled Tungurahua and not western Loja to beneﬁt from incentives and
protection for industry established during the developmentalist periods
following World War II.
8. The drastic changes include the virtual disappearance of the produc-
tion of temperate-zone fruits, such as plums, pears, and apples, because of
competition from Chile; the closing of many textile and shoemaking
factories because of competition from Colombia and China; and the near-
disappearance of local production of jeans in Pelileo (various interviews
with producers; on the crisis of jeans production, see Martı´nez & North,
2009).
9. Pa´ramos are Andean tundra ecosystems located above the forest line.
The shrubs and grasses fulﬁll an important function in capturing water.
10. See Hollenstein and Ospina (2014) for a detailed description of the
New Management Model.
11. In the two territories in Loja, consumption increased and poverty
decreased, although social inequality increased (Ospina, Andrade et al.,
2012). It is important to note that the case studies and data from the 2010
population census, which were recently made available, conﬁrm that the
two territories continue to experience a positive socio-economic dynamic.
12. One example is that a coﬀee exporting business founded by a local
merchant family began its own campaign in 2010 to improve coﬀee
quality, paying growers higher prices.13. “The habitus contains the solution to the paradoxes of objective
meaning without subjective intention. It is the source of these strings of
’moves’ which are objectively organized as strategies without being the
product of a genuine strategic intention” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 62). The
concept of habitus is similar to the less-familiar concept of “civilizational
competence” developed by Piotr Sztompka (2000).14. The historical industrialization of Tuscany, based on small enter-
prises, also led Bagnasco, 1988, p. 31–74) to conclude, in his own words,
that policy interventions play a very limited role, and that the
“spontaneous” growth of a market organized according to rules that
favored family enterprises carried greater weight.
94 WORLD DEVELOPMENTREFERENCESBagnasco, A. (1977). Tre Italie: la problematica territoriale del sviluppo
italiano. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Bagnasco, A. (1988). La costruzione Sociale del Mercato. Bologna: Il
Mulino.
Berdegue´, J. A., Aguirre, F., Chiriboga, M., Escobal, J., Favareto, A.,
Ferna´ndez, I., et al. (2012). Desarrollo Territorial Rural en Ame´rica
Latina: Determinantes y Opciones de Polı´tica. In J. Berdegue´, & F.
Modrego (Eds.), De Yucata´n a Chiloe´. Dina´micas territoriales en
Ame´rica Latina (pp. 17–70). Buenos Aires: Teseo, Rimisp.
Berdegue´, J. A., Bebbington, A., & Escobal, J. (2015). Conceptualizing
spatial diversity in Latin American rural development: structures,
institutions and coalitions. World Development, 73, 1–10.
Berdegue´, J. A., Escobal, J., & Bebbington, A. (2015). Explaining spatial
diversity in Latin American rural development: structures, institutions
and coalitions. World Development, 73, 129–137.
Borgatti, S. P., Everett, M. G., & Freeman, L.C. (2002). Ucinet [Computer
software]. Available at <http://www.analytictech.com/>.
Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1990). The logic of practice. Stanford: Stanford University
Press.
Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. (1992). An invitation to reﬂexive sociology.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bromley, R. (1975). Periodic and daily markets in highland Ecuador
(doctoral dissertation). Cambridge: University of Cambridge. Re-
trieved from Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 7621058).
Bromley, R. (1980). The role of commerce in the growth of towns in
Central Highland Ecuador, 1750–1920. In W. Borah, J. Hardoy, & G.
A. Stelter (Eds.), Urbanization in the Americas: The background in
comparative perspective (pp. 25–34). Ottawa: National Museum of
Man.
Bromley, R., & Bromley, R. D. (1976). Cambios de los dı´as de feria en la
Sierra central del Ecuador durante el siglo XIX. Revista del Archivo
Histo´rico del Guayas, 5(9), 15–16.
Burgos, H. (1997 [1970]). Relaciones intere´tnicas en Riobamba. Dominio y
dependencia en una regio´n indı´gena ecuatoriana. Quito: CEN.
Elbers, C., Lanjouw, J., & Lanjouw, P. (2003). Micro-level estimation of
poverty and inequality. Econometrica, 71(1), 355–364.
Elbers, C., Lanjouw, J., & Lanjouw, P. (2005). Imputed welfare estimates
in regression analysis. Journal of Economic Geography, 5(1), 101–
118.
Ferna´ndez, M. I., Asensio, R. H., Trivelli, C., & Schejtman, A. (2014). Las
coaliciones sociales transformadoras y los dilemas del desarrollo
inclusivo en las zonas rurales de Ame´rica Latina. In M. I. Ferna´ndez,
& R. H. Asensio (Eds.), ¿Unidos podemos? Coaliciones territoriales y
desarrollo rural en Ame´rica Latina (pp. 19–52). Lima: Instituto de
Estudios Peruanos/Rimisp.
Fligstein, N. (2001). The architecture of markets. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Gangotena, C. (2011). El NMG de Tungurahua desde la mirada del control
social. Unpublished manuscript, Universidad Andina Simo´n Bolı´var.
Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of
structuration. Cambridge: John Wiley & Sons.
PGT. (2007a). Una provincia prendida en el presente. Unpublished
manuscript, PGT.
PGT. (2007b). Estrategia agropecuaria de Tungurahua. ¡Una minga por el
agro de Tungurahua!. Ambato: HCPT/PDDL/Intercooperation/GTZ/
DED/PGT.
PGT. (2010). Agenda de productividad y competitividad de Tungurahua.
Ambato: PGT.
PGT. (2011). Estrategia territorial de la provincia de Tungurahua.
Unpublished manuscript, PGT.
Granovetter, M. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of
Sociology, 78(6), 1360–1380.
Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The
problem of embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, (91),
481–510.
Granovetter, M. (2005). The impact of social structure on economic
outcomes. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(1), 33–50.
Hanssen-Bauer, J. (1982). Plaza Panchano. Market integration, interme-
diaries and rural diﬀerentiation in Tungurahua, Ecuador (Master thesis).
Oslo: University of Oslo.Herna´ndez, V. (2008). El Gobierno Provincial de Tungurahua. (Re)Vivi-
endo la Democracia. Quito: Intercooperation.
Herna´ndez, V. (2009). El nuevo modelo de gestio´n: una forma diferente de
ser gobierno provincial. Viviendo la democracia. Quito: PGT/Interco-
operation/COSUDE/PDDL.
Hirschman, A. O. (1963). Journeys toward progress: Studies of economic
policy-making in Latin America. New York: The Twentieth Century
Fund.
Ho, S. (1979). Decentralized industrialization and rural development:
Evidence from Taiwan. Economic Development and Cultural Change,
28(1), 77–96.
Ho, S. (1982). Economic development and rural industry in South Korea
and Taiwan. World Development, 10(11), 973–990.
Hollenstein, P., & Ospina, P. (2011). Relaciones econo´micas equilibradas.
El caso de las redes productivas de Tungurahua. Unpublished manu-
script, Rimisp.
Hollenstein, P. (2011). Entre Participacio´n y Exclusio´n: las Redes
Comerciales del Mercado Mayorista de Ambato. In P. Ospina (Ed.),
El Territorio de Senderos que se Bifurcan. Tungurahua: Economı´a,
Sociedad y Desarrollo (pp. 247–302). Quito: CEN/UASB.
Hollenstein, P., & Ospina, P. (2014). La promesa de crecer juntos.
Coaliciones sociales y polı´ticas pu´blicas en Tungurahua (Ecuador). In
M. I. Ferna´ndez, & R. H. Asensio (Eds.), ¿Unidos podemos? Coalic-
iones territoriales y desarrollo rural en Ame´rica Latina (pp. 205–237).
Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.
Ibarra, H. (1987). Tierra, mercado y capital comercial en la Sierra Central.
El caso de Tungurahua (1850–1930) (Master thesis). Quito: Facultad
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales.
Kay, C. (2002). Why East Asia overtook Latin America: Agrarian reform,
industrialisation and development. Third World Quarterly, 23(6),
1073–1102.
Krippner, G., Granovetter, M., Block, F., Biggart, N., Beamish, T.,
Hsing, Y., et al. (2004). Polanyi symposium: A conversation on
embeddedness. Socio-Economic Review, 2(1), 109–135.
Krugman, P. (1991). Increasing returns and economic geography. Journal
of Political Economy, 99(3), 483–499.
Larrea, C., Landı´n, R., Andrande, D., Wrborich, W., & Fraga, R. (2008).
Mapas de Pobreza, Consumo por Habitante y Desigualdad Social en el
Ecuador: 1995–2006 (Report No. 13). Santiago: Rimisp.
Larrea, C., Landı´n, R., Larrea, A. I., Andrande, D., Wrborich, W., &
Fraga, R. (2011). Caracterizacio´n: Evolucio´n de las Condiciones
Sociales en Tungurahua (1950–2006). In P. Ospina (Ed.), El Territorio
de Senderos que se Bifurcan. Tungurahua: Economı´a, Sociedad y
Desarrollo (pp. 99–148). Quito: CEN/UASB.
Larrea, C., Larrea, A. I., Andrade, D., & Maldonado, P. (2011). Mapas de
pobreza, consumo por habitante y desigualdad. In P. Ospina (Ed.), El
Territorio de Senderos que se Bifurcan. Tungurahua: Economı´a,
Sociedad y Desarrollo. Quito: CEN/UASB.
Mahoney, J., & Thelen, K. A. (2010). A theory of gradual institutional
change. In J. Mahoney, & K. A. Thelen (Eds.), Explaining institutional
change: Ambiguity, agency, and power (pp. 1–37). Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Marcha´n, C., & Andrade, B. (1986). Estructura agraria de la Sierra centro
norte 1830–1930. Quito: Banco Central del Ecuador.
Martı´nez, L., & North, L. L. (2009). Vamos dando la vuelta. Iniciativas
endo´genas de desarrollo local en la Sierra ecuatoriana. Quito: Flacso.
Marx, K. (1996). The eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. In T.
Carver (Ed.), Marx: Later political writings (pp. 31–127). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Metais, S. (2000). Diagno´stico socioecono´mico y los sistemas agrarios de
la cuenca del Rı´o Ambato. Report presented to CICDA/PROMACH.
Modrego, F., & Sanclemente, X. (2007). La red de comercializacio´n de la
fresa en Michoaca´n, Me´xico: una mirada estructural (Debates y temas
rurales No. 7). Santiago: Rimisp.
Moore, B. (1979). Social origins of dictatorship and democracy. New York:
Penguin Books.
North, D. C. (2005). Understanding the process of economic change.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
North, L. L. (2008). Diversiﬁcacio´n rural endo´gena: empresas textiles
familiares en Pelileo, Tungurahua. In L. L. North, & J. D. Cameron
(Eds.), Desarrollo rural y neoliberalismo: Ecuador desde una perspectiva
comparativa (pp. 255–276). Quito: CEN/UASB.
TERRITORIAL COALITIONS AND RURAL DYNAMICS IN ECUADOR. WHY HISTORY MATTERS 95Nu´n˜ez, P., & Vega, J. (1992). Ana´lisis histo´rico de la problema´tica del riego
en la provincia de Tungurahua (thesis). Quito: Pontiﬁcia Universidad
Cato´lica del Ecuador.
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Public goods and the theory
of groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Ospina, P., Alvarado, M., Camacho, G., Carrio´n, D., Chiriboga, M.,
Hollenstein, P., et al. (2012). Tungurahua Rural en Ecuador: el
Territorio de Senderos que se Bifurcan. In J. Berdegue´, & F. Modrego
(Eds.), De Yucata´n a Chiloe´. Dina´micas Territoriales en Ame´rica Latina
(pp. 209–244). Buenos Aires: Teseo/Rimisp.
Ospina, P., Alvarado, M., Camacho, G., Carrio´n, D., Chiriboga, M.,
Hollenstein, P., et al. (2011). Los Senderos Actuales y las Amenazas al
Jardı´n: la Reproduccio´n del Desarrollo Econo´mico en Tungurahua. In
P. Ospina (Ed.), El Territorio de Senderos que se Bifurcan. Tungurahua:
Economı´a, Sociedad y Desarrollo (pp. 149–210). Quito: CEN/UASB.
Ospina, P., Andrade, D., Castro, S., Chiriboga, M., Hollenstein, P.,
Larrea, C., et al. (2012). Cafe´ y maı´z en Loja: crecimiento sustentable o
pasajero?. In J. Berdegue´, & F. Modrego (Eds.), De Yucata´n a Chiloe´.
Dina´micas Territoriales en Ame´rica Latina (pp. 245–278). Buenos
Aires: Teseo/Rimisp.
Ospina, P., Bebbington, A., Hollenstein, P., Nussbaum, I., & Ramı´rez, E.
(2012). Desarrollo, ambiente e inversiones extraterritoriales. In P.
Ospina, & P. Hollenstein (Eds.), Jama´s tan Cerca Arremetio´ lo Lejos.
Inversiones Extraterritoriales, Crisis Ambiental y Accio´n Colectiva en
Ame´rica Latina (pp. 11–50). Quito: UASB/Rimisp/Ediciones La Tierra.
Ospina, P., Hollenstein, P., & Poma, J. (2012). Territorios rurales y
globalizacio´n: la fragmentacio´n espacial de la Provincia de Loja
(Ecuador). In R. Herna´ndez (Ed.), Peru´: Problemas agrarios al debate.
SEPIA XIV (pp. 149–176). Lima: Seminario Permanente de Investi-
gacio´n Agraria.
Pierson, P. (2004). Politics in time: History, institutions, and social analysis.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Pietri-Le´vy, A. L. (1995). Loja, una provincia del Ecuador. Quito: Banco
Central de Ecuador.PREDESUR. (1980). Plan de desarrollo regional del sur ecuatoriano 1980–
2005. Loja: PREDESUR.
QSR International. (2012). NVivo 10 [Computer software]. Available
from <http://www.qsrinternational.com>.
Riker, W. (1962). The theory of political coalitions. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Ruf, T. (2001). Water disputes in the Ecuadorian context up to the Third
Millennium: No state, no market, no common property. The transition
of Santa Rosa (Tungurahua province). International Journal of Water,
1(3–4), 250–269.
Ruf, T. (2006). Recursos compartidos y derechos dina´micos: la lucha
histo´rica por el agua en la provincia de Tungurahua, Ecuador. In R.
Boelens, D. Getches, & A. Guevara Gil (Eds.), Agua y derecho:
polı´ticas hı´dricas, derechos consuetudinarios e identidades locales. Lima:
Instituto de Estudios Peruanos/WALIR.
SPSS. (2008). SPSS [Computer software]. Available from <http://www-
01.ibm.com/software/analytics/spss/>.
Sztompka, P. (2000). Civilizational competence: A prerequisite of post-
communist transition. Center for European Studies.
Tanaka, M. (2014). En busca del eslabo´n perdido. Coaliciones sociales y
procesos polı´ticos en el desarrollo territorial rural. In M. I. Ferna´ndez,
& R. H. Asensio (Eds.), ¿Unidos podemos? Coaliciones territoriales y
desarrollo rural en Ame´rica Latina (pp. 53–88). Lima: Instituto de
Estudios Peruanos.
Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Nueva York: Random
House.
Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto players: How political institutions work. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press.
White, H. (2008). Identity and control: How social formations emerge.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.ScienceDirect
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
